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RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN CONTRACTS OF ADHESION
By
Jeff Dasteel*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Suppose you are making a purchase over the Internet. As a part of the purchase
process, you click on a tab that confirms your agreement to the seller’s non-negotiable
terms and conditions. The terms can be viewed and printed out by clicking on yet
another tab.1 Had you clicked on the terms and conditions tab (most of us do not), you
would have found out that by agreeing to the terms and conditions imposed by the seller,
you agreed to resolve any disputes between you and the seller in religious arbitration
presided over by an arbitrator who must be a respected member of a particular religious
community. Should you be required to resolve your dispute in religious arbitration even
if you hold sincere religious objections to the procedure?
In a recent series of articles critical of private arbitration, the New York Times
reported on situations where individuals against their will were required by courts to
engage in religious arbitration to resolve secular disputes.2 In one case, a court required
two former Scientologists to resolve their claims of fraud against the Church of
Scientology using a current Scientologist as arbitrator even though current church
members are required to consider former church members to be “suppressive persons.”3
In another case, a court required a mother suing a faith-based drug rehabilitation
organization for the wrongful death of her son to bring her claim in Christian Conciliation
before a Christian arbitrator where the governing law would be the Bible and not secular
wrongful death law.4
A key feature of private arbitration is the ability of parties to design their own
procedures to resolve their disputes.5 This includes religious arbitration where the parties
*
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1

See, e.g., Fagerstrom v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 15-cv-96-BAS-DHB, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143295, at
*4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2015) (explaining that “by placing your order, you agree to Amazon.com's privacy
notice and conditions of use” was sufficient notice to bind purchaser to adhesive arbitration agreement).
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Michael Corkery & Jessice Silver-Greenberg, In Religious Arbitration, Scripture Is The Rule of Law, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/03/business/dealbook/in-religious-arbitration-sc
ripture-is-the-rule-of-law.html?_r=0.
3

Corkery & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 2.
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See Volt Info Scis. v. Board of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 472 (1989); see also Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle,
539 U.S. 444 (2003); Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002); First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, U.S. 938 (1995); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52
(1995).
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have agreed to have their disputes resolved based on religious principles before a
religious tribunal comprised of arbitrators who are members of the designated religion
and who meet specified religious qualifications and standards. Courts in the United
States enforce these religious arbitration agreements and the resulting arbitral awards
under the Federal Arbitration Act.6
Religious arbitration agreements add a sectarian gloss to private arbitration that
makes arbitral decisions, which already are subject to very narrow grounds of court
review, virtually unreviewable. This is so because courts in the United States defer to
religious adjudicatory institutions on ecclesiastical issues so as not to become entangled
in religion.7 For parties who knowingly and voluntarily enter into religious arbitration
agreements, the adjudication of both religious and secular disputes using religious
principles and sectarian arbitrators is entirely consistent with the free exercise of religion,
and the courts should continue to enforce the resulting religious arbitration awards under
the Federal Arbitration Act and analogue state arbitration acts.8 Indeed, failure to honor
the parties’ voluntary agreement to engage in religious arbitration may violate the parties’
free exercise of religion.9
But what if religious arbitration regarding a secular matter is imposed on one of
the parties in a procedurally unconscionable arbitration agreement in opposition to that
party’s sincerely held religious beliefs? For example, what if a widely used software
license in a contract of adhesion imposes religious arbitration on licensees of all faiths
and religious beliefs as a condition of use? Or, as hypothesized in the example above,
what if a seller of a product imposes religious arbitration on consumers in a contract of
adhesion, regardless of the religious beliefs of the customers? This article argues that
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act or the doctrine of abstention parties should
not be permitted to use the power of the courts to enforce religious arbitration agreements
included in contracts of adhesion when there is a disparity in bargaining power and the
weaker party holds a sincere religious belief opposing religious arbitration.10
II. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Religious arbitration agreements commonly are entered into between or among
members of a particular religion to resolve ecclesiastical or secular disputes before
religious arbitral tribunals under religious principles rather than in secular courts or
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See infra Section III.B.
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See infra Section III.A.
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See infra Section III.B.
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Despite the somewhat alarmist tone of the New York Times article on religious arbitration, currently there
is little evidence of widespread use of religious arbitration in contracts of adhesion. Nonetheless, given the
increasing use of religious arbitration and the anecdotal appearance of religious arbitration in contracts of
adhesion, there is the need to determine when such arbitration agreements are enforceable.
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secular arbitration.11 Religious arbitration agreements are distinctive from secular
arbitration in two fundamental respects. First, these agreements typically designate
religious texts as the choice of substantive and procedural law, rather than secular
procedures and laws. For example, the most popular Christian arbitration rule set in the
United States provides that “Conciliators [arbitrators] shall take into consideration any
state, federal, or local laws that the parties bring to their attention, but the Holy Scriptures
(the Bible) shall be the supreme authority governing every aspect of the conciliation
process.”12 Similarly, Jewish arbitrations held under at least one version of Beth Din
rules of religious arbitration provide that “[t]he Beth Din will strive to encourage the
parties to resolve disputes according to the compromise or settlement related to Jewish
law principles (p’shara krova l’din).”13 Although not yet well developed in the United
States, Islamic arbitration resolves disputes based on fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence).14
In addition, religious arbitration agreements also typically require the arbitrators
to qualify under some form of religious test. For Christian arbitration following the
Rules of the Institute for Christian Conciliation, “[a]ll conciliators shall affirm the
Statement of Faith contained in the Institute for Christian Conciliation’s Standard of
Conduct for Christian Conciliators.”15 Under one version of the Beth Din Rules of
Arbitration, all the arbitrators must be either rabbis or “religiously observant individuals
involved in the various professions.”16 The arbitration procedures also may reflect
religious doctrine,17 church involvement in secular disputes involving members of the

11

See e.g., CTR. FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, GUIDELINES FOR CHRISTIAN CONCILIATION 11 (explaining
that “generally, Christians are not free to sue other Christians, at least not until they have exhausted the
process that Jesus sets forth in Matthew 18:15-20 and 1 Corinthians 6:1-8. God instructs Christians to
resolve their disputes within the church itself, with the assistance of other Christians if necessary.”); BETH
DIN OF AMERICA, RULES AND PROCEDURES, http://bethdin.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Rules.pdf (last
visited Dec. 8, 2015) (stating that “the Beth Din of America provides a forum where adherents of Jewish
law can seek to have their disputes resolved in a manner consistent with the rules of Jewish law (halacha)
and with the recognition that many individuals conduct commercial transactions in accordance with the
commercial standards of the secular society.”).
12

Rules of Procedure, INST. FOR CHRISTIAN CONCILIATION, r. 4, http://peacemmaker.net/rules-of-procedure/
(last visited Dec. 15, 2015).
13

BETH DIN OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 4.

14

See M. ALI SADIQI, ISLAMIC DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE SHADE OF THE AMERICAN COURT HOUSE (Oct.
2010),
https://www.academia.edu/11813987/Islamic_Arbitration_in_the_Shade_of_the_American_Court_House;
see also Our Constitution, ISLAMIC TRIBUNAL, http://www.islamictribunal.org/our-constitution/ (last visited
Dec. 9, 2015) (requiring that “the IT shall apply the principles of KITAB, SUNNAH and Islamic
jurisprudence (FIQH) to solve the problems without adherence to any spastic school of thought
(MADHAB)”).
15

Rules of Procedure, supra note 12, r. 10.

16

BETH DIN OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 1.

17

Rules of Procedure, supra note 12, r. 13 (explaining that “during arbitration, attorneys may represent and
speak for their clients” but “will be expected to respect the conciliatory nature of the process and avoid
unnecessary advocacy”); BETH DIN OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 5 (stating that “the Beth Din of America
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church,18 or special rules of evidence or procedures that reflect religious doctrine on, e.g.,
the gender of witnesses or evidentiary standards.19
Religious arbitration may involve ecclesiastical disputes, secular disputes, or a
combination of both. The distinction between an ecclesiastical dispute and a secular
dispute is important because, as a matter First Amendment law, courts will not become
involved in ecclesiastical disputes.20 As discussed below, the distinction between
ecclesiastical and secular disputes is blurred when the parties elect to resolve secular
disputes before a religious tribunal under religious principles.
III. THE INTERSECTION OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

AND

SECULAR ENFORCEMENT

OF

Resolution of a secular dispute may take place in the civil courts, private secular
arbitration or, potentially, religious arbitration. When a secular matter is resolved in
religious arbitration, there may be ecclesiastical issues surrounding the means and
manner of adjudication. This section discusses the interaction between civil courts and
religious arbitration of ecclesiastical and secular matters.
A. The Doctrine of Non-interference in Ecclesiastical Matters
The First Amendment to the Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”21
This has been interpreted to mean that the courts of the United States will not interfere in
ecclesiastical disputes.22 Instead, courts will enforce the decisions of the highest church

accepts that Jewish law as understood by the Beth Din will provide the rules of decision and rules of
procedure that govern the functioning of the Beth Din or any of its panels.”).
18

For example, the Institute for Christian Conciliation’s procedures provide:

[T]he conciliators may discuss a case with the church leaders of parties who profess to be Christians. If a
party who professes to be a Christian is unwilling to cooperate with the conciliation process or refuses to
abide by an agreement reached during mediation, an advisory opinion, or an arbitration decision, the
Administrator or the other parties may report the matter to the leaders of that person’s church and request
that they actively participate in resolving the dispute
Rules of Procedure, supra note 12, r. 17.
19

See Michael A. Helfand, Between Law and Religion: Procedural Challenges to Religious Arbitration
Awards, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 141, 145 n.26 (2015) (setting forth that “the focus in this article will be on
instances where a rabbinical court applies Jewish law’s rule prohibiting female testimony”).
20

See infra Section III.A.

21

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

22

Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).

48

tribunal for religious matters, unless the tribunal’s decision violates an important public
policy or was obtained through fraud or collusion engaged in for a secular purpose.23
In Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,24 an Illinois state court invalidated
the church’s decision to defrock a bishop because “the proceedings of the Mother Church
respecting [the bishop] were procedurally and substantively defective under the internal
regulations of the Mother Church and were therefore arbitrary and invalid.”25 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that “where resolution of the disputes cannot be made
without extensive inquiry by civil courts into religious law and polity, the First and
Fourteenth Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the
highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity, but must accept such
decisions as binding on them, in their application to the religious issues of doctrine or
polity before them.”26
The Supreme Court made clear that courts must accept the decisions of religious
tribunals even if they are arbitrary:
We have concluded that, whether or not there is room for
"marginal civil court review" under the narrow rubrics of "fraud"
or "collusion" when church tribunals act in bad faith for secular
purposes, no "arbitrariness" exception -- in the sense of an inquiry
whether the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal of a
hierarchical church complied with church laws and regulations -- is
consistent with the constitutional mandate that civil courts are
bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a
religious organization of hierarchical polity on matters of
discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule,
custom, or law.27
The Supreme Court reasoned “it is the essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical
decisions are reached and are to be accepted as matters of faith, whether or not rational or
measurable by objective criteria. Constitutional concepts of due process, involving
secular notions of ‘fundamental fairness’ or impermissible objectives, are therefore
hardly relevant to such matters of ecclesiastical cognizance.”28
To prevent entanglement between the civil courts and religious adjudicatory
processes, the courts therefore are commanded to keep their hands off religious tribunals’
decision-making process. Instead, the courts are required to accept whatever decision is
achieved by the religious organizations’ highest adjudicative body on questions of

23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Id. at 697.

26

Id. at 709.

27

Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713.

28

Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713.

49

“discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law,” except
possibly in cases of fraud or collusion engaged in for a secular purpose. This doctrine of
non-interference is mandated by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to preserve
freedom of religion and the separation of church and state.
B. Secular Enforcement of Religious Arbitration Agreements Under the Federal
Arbitration Act and State Arbitration Laws
The non-interference doctrine has an effect on secular enforcement of religious
arbitration agreements. As has been said frequently, the Federal Arbitration Act was
enacted to overcome judicial hostility to private arbitration.29 Section 2 of the Federal
Arbitration Act declares arbitration agreements “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract” under
state law.30 The United States Supreme Court has held that the Federal Arbitration Act
preempts state laws that interfere with this mandate.31
An important aspect of private arbitration agreements is party autonomy to devise
rules of arbitration that may be different from litigation procedures available in the
courts. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “courts must ‘rigorously enforce’
arbitration agreements according to their terms . . . including terms that ‘specify with
whom [the parties] choose to arbitrate their disputes,’ . . . and ‘the rules under which that
arbitration will be conducted . . . ’”32
It is in this context that courts have upheld the right of parties to engage in
religious arbitration if they so choose.33 Applying the Federal Arbitration Act, courts
have compelled parties to participate in religious arbitration even if the parties’ selected
rules of arbitration require prayer as a part of the proceedings in the face of objections
from one of the parties,34 require resolution of the dispute under religious, rather than
secular principles,35 or require the arbitrators to meet a religious test.36 Indeed, at least
29

AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011); American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308-09 (2013).
30

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2016).

31

Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352.

32

Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2309 (internal citations omitted); see also DIRECTV v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct.
463, 468 (2015) (noting freedom of parties to select choice of law in arbitration agreements, the Court
stated “[i]n principle, they might choose to have portions of their contract governed by the law of Tibet, the
law of pre-revolutionary Russia, or (as is relevant here) the law of California”).
33

Matter of Goldman (Pinkesz), 977 N.Y.S.2d 667, 667 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (“It is well established that
New York courts can enforce an agreement to refer a controversy to a Beth Din, a Jewish rabbinical forum,
to proceed with religious arbitration[.]”); Spivey v. Teen Challenge of Florida, Inc., 122 So.3d 986, 992
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (noting that presumption in favor of arbitration “extends to private religious
arbitration, which is exceedingly common in our pluralistic religious society”).
34

See Spivey, 122 So.3d at 995.

35

Id.
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one court has held that a party’s representative can be compelled to participate in such
proceedings even if required to engage in religious conduct.37
The principles governing religious arbitration make it distinctive from court
proceedings and secular arbitration. These same principles mean that religious
arbitrations are all but unreviewable under the Federal Arbitration Act because courts will
not review ecclesiastic rules or procedures for fairness.38 For example, suppose one party
challenges whether the selected arbitrator met the qualifications required in the parties’
arbitration agreement.
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, a challenge to the
qualifications of an arbitrator can be heard at the time of an application to set aside or
confirm an arbitral award.39 However, a court is incompetent in the case of a religious
arbitration to determine whether a particular arbitrator met the religious qualifications in
the arbitration agreement because such an analysis by the court would be an
impermissible entanglement in ecclesiastical matters.40 Instead, the decision on whether
a particular arbitrator meets the religious qualifications set forth in the religious
arbitration agreement is left to the proper appointing authority.41 As a consequence, a
challenge to whether a selected arbitrator met designated requirements is reviewable in
the context of secular arbitration, but unreviewable in the context of religious
arbitration.42
Similarly, a court has no authority to tell a religious arbitration tribunal that it is or
is not conducting itself properly under a religious rule set.43 To do so would require
interpretation of the religious rule set and, therefore, entangle the court in ecclesiastical
36

One court enforced an arbitration agreement where:

The Arbitrator must be a Saudi national or a Moslem foreigner chosen amongst the members of the liberal
professions or other persons. He may also be chosen amongst state officials after agreement of the authority
on which he depends. Should there be several arbitrators, the Chairman must know the Shari‘a, commercial
laws and the customs in force in the Kingdom.
In re Aramco Servs. Co., No. 01-09-00624-CV, 2010 WL 1241525, at *2 (Tex. App. Mar. 19, 2010).
37

Spivey, 122 So.3d 986.

38

Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).

39

Aviall, Inc. v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 110 F.3d 892, 895 (2d Cir. 1997); Gulf Guar. Life Ins. Co. v. Connecticut
Gen. Life Ins. Co., 304 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2002); Michaels v. Mariforum Shipping, S.A., 624 F.2d 411, 414
n.4 (2d Cir. 1980); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Meadows Indem. Co., 870 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
40

Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696.

41

See In re Aramco Servs. Co., 2010 WL 1241525 (court was not proper authority to select arbitrators
where parties’ agreement required three Muslim arbitrators to be selected under Saudi arbitration rules and
Saudi institution was the proper selecting authority).
42

Under Section 5 of the Federal Arbitration Act, a court generally has the power to select arbitrators, if
need be, when the parties’ arbitrator selection mechanism fails. See, e.g., Pac. Reinsurance Mgmt. Corp. v.
Ohio Reinsurance Corp., 814 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1987). However, in Religious arbitration, a court would
be incompetent to determine whether potential arbitrators met specific religious requirements as provided
for in the arbitration agreement.
43

Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696.
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issues.44 A courts’ refusal to become involved in the procedures and decision-making of
religious arbitration tribunals and administrative bodies furthers the goal of religious
freedom for those who voluntarily enter into religious arbitration agreements and want
their secular disputes resolved based on religious principles by arbitrators who
themselves share the religious beliefs of the litigants and who agree to adhere to
designated religious principles and procedures to resolve the disputes.45
Notwithstanding the First Amendment’s prohibition against entanglement in
religious belief, some courts have contended that religious arbitration awards are
reviewable in the same manner as secular arbitration awards under neutral principles of
law.46 In Easterly v. Heritage Christian Schools, Inc., the court granted an application to
compel religious arbitration over the objection of one of the parties.47 The court opined:
An arbitrator's decision [in religious arbitration] is subject to being
overturned by a reviewing court for ‘manifest disregard’ of the
law, and ‘where a governing legal principle is well defined,
explicit, and clearly applicable to the case, and where the arbitrator
ignored it after it was brought to the arbitrator's attention in a way
that assures that the arbitrator knew its controlling nature, his
disregard of it is ‘manifest.’48
The Easterly court went on to contend:
The arbitrator's decision will not be the decision of a ‘religious
tribunal’ regarding a religious matter; instead, it will be the
resolution of a legal claim that will be subject to judicial review the
same as if it had been conducted pursuant to the American
Arbitration Association's procedural rules or any other set of
secular procedures.49
The Easterly court’s underlying premise that religious arbitration of a secular
matter is not the decision of a religious tribunal is incorrect. Religious arbitration is, by
definition and intent, a religious tribunal, regardless of whether it adjudicates an
ecclesiastical or secular matter. The whole point of religious arbitration is to have a
44

Id.

45

But see Helfand, supra note 19 (arguing that treating designation of religious law more like any other
choice of law would permit a reasonable review of religious arbitration awards).
46

See Emily A. Belfer, Judicial Review Of Religious Arbitration--Is There Too Much Or Not Enough? L.
STUDENT CONNECTION (May 10, 2013, 6:53 PM), http://nysbar.com/blogs/lawstudentconnection/2013/05
/judicial_review_of_religious_a.html.
47

Easterly v. Heritage Christian Schools, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-1714-WTL-TAB, 2009 WL 2750099 (S.D. Ind.
Aug. 26, 2009).
48

Easterly, 2009 WL 2750099 at *3 n.3.

49

Id.
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dispute determined using religious principles and rules by a religious tribunal. Delving
into a Christian arbitrator’s interpretation of governing Biblical law and whether the
Christian arbitrator manifestly disregarded Biblical principles, even in the context of a
secular dispute, would require the court to impermissibly entangle itself in religious
doctrine. Where a religious arbitration tribunal’s decision turns on the application of
religious doctrine, the court would have to make a determination of what the religious
doctrine is and whether the religious tribunal has properly adhered to the doctrine. This
is something the Supreme Court refused to do in Serbian Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich. Thus, contrary to the Easterly court’s contention, a court would not be
permitted to apply the same kind of review to a religious arbitration award that would be
permitted for secular arbitrations.50
In Encore Productions, Inc. v. Promise Keepers, one party objected to religious
arbitration on the basis that the court “should not enforce Christian Conciliation because
theological conclusions made in the Conciliation may not be reviewed by the courts.”51
The court rejected this objection as premature, holding that:
A court can, and should, apply neutral principles of law to
determine disputed questions that do not implicate religious
doctrine. "Neutral principles" are secular legal rules whose
application to religious parties or disputes do not entail theological
or religious evaluations. I recognize that I must diligently avoid
impermissible First Amendment entanglement. However, by
employing neutral principles, courts can review decisions of
religious bodies within permissible constitutional boundaries.
Thus, if cause is later shown to review the Christian Conciliation's
arbitration results, a court can do so within the limitations
governing review of any arbitration award. This is especially true
in this case where the claims do not involve religious
determinations or doctrines.52
The Encore Productions court noted that “refusal to enforce the parties' arbitration
agreement could itself arguably constitute an impermissible entanglement. PK [Promise
Keepers] could claim impedance of the practice of religion or creation of an unjust bias
against religion, thereby depriving PK of its free exercise rights.”53
Although the court’s premise that it may apply neutral principles of law to
determine disputed questions so long as they do not implicate religious doctrine is true,54
50

See Lang v. Levi, 16 A.3d 980, 989 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (Noting that “[t]he addition of the
religious context further narrows the [already narrow vacatur] standard to make our intervention nearly
impossible.”).
51

Encore Prods., Inc. v. Promise Keepers, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1111 (D. Colo. 1999).

52

Encore Prods., 53 F. Supp. 2d at 1112 (citation omitted).

53

Id. at 1113.

54

See, e.g., Beth Jacob Teachers Seminary Inc. v. Beis Chinuch Le’Bunos-Bas Melech, No. 12218/08, 2009
WL 782549, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 24, 2009) (Beth Din arbitration award vacated where “Beth Din's
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the court’s implication that the scope of such review is the same for review of any
arbitration award is plainly untrue. As shown above, a court could not pass on whether
an arbitrator met specified religious qualifications, though it would be required to
conduct such a review for a secular arbitration. A court could not pass on whether the
arbitrators in carrying out their duties manifestly disregarded some tenet of religious law,
though it may be required to conduct such a review for a secular arbitration. Finally, a
court could not pass on whether principles and procedures of religious adjudication are
one-sided or “fair” to the participants, though it may be required to conduct such a review
for secular arbitration. In the end, the grounds for review of a religious arbitration award
necessarily are narrower than for a secular arbitration award. Indeed, the “hands off”
approach to religious arbitration awards is precisely what parties to religious arbitration
agreements presumably desire.
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN CONTRACTS OF
ADHESION IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE WEAKER PARTY’S SINCERE RELIGIOUS
BELIEFS
A contract of adhesion is a “standardized contract, drafted by the party of superior
bargaining strength, that relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere
to the contract or reject it.”55 The weaker party has the choice to accept all the terms of
the contract or none of them. For an employment situation, the prospective employee
may be most concerned about salary and the nature of the employment, but nonetheless
must accept all terms that go along with it. For example, an employer may impose a
standardized, non-negotiable arbitration agreement on its employees as a condition of
employment. Similarly, a consumer may be interested in the character and price of a
product. But, a seller may impose a non-negotiable arbitration agreement on the
consumer as a condition of purchase. Software licensors may require consumer licensees
to agree to arbitration agreements on a take-it-or-leave-it basis as a condition of use by
clicking on an “acceptance” button.
Whether or not the party with weaker bargaining power actually reads the entire
adhesive agreement, the non-negotiable dispute resolution clauses are ancillary to the
subject matter of the transaction and, therefore, even if accepted, do not necessarily
represent a truly voluntary agreement to their provisions. That is why both federal and
state laws permit challenges to adhesive arbitration agreements when they are
procedurally and substantively unconscionable. This section of the article considers
enforcement of religious arbitration agreements in contracts of adhesion against the
weaker party’s religious beliefs.

clerk, who was present during the entire arbitration hearing, was married to an employee of Beth Jacob in
conjunction with the fact that the clerk informed the Beth Din of the results of a private telephone
conversation he had with his wife during the hearing with respect to one of the issues in dispute which
resolved this issue in Beth Jacob’s favor creates more than the requisite inference of partiality and bias.”).
55

Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1148 (9th Cir.2003) (citations omitted).
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A. Enforcement of Religious Arbitration Agreements in Contracts of Adhesion
It is one thing for a court to enforce voluntary agreements to enter into religious
arbitration regarding secular disputes between parties of approximately equal bargaining
power. Enforcement of such agreements comports with the Congressional policy
favoring agreements to arbitrate and the religious freedom of the litigants to determine
the manner in which they arbitrate. It is quite another thing for courts to impose religious
arbitration regarding secular disputes on a party to a contract of adhesion whose objection
to religious arbitration is based on sincerely held religious belief. In such cases, the
question is whether the unwilling party’s religious rights trump the facially neutral
federal and state laws that otherwise would require arbitration of the dispute.
As discussed above, the Federal Arbitration Act, a facially religion-neutral law,
implements a pro-arbitration policy requiring courts to give effect to valid agreements to
engage in private arbitration “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.”56 Relying on this pro-arbitration policy, courts enforce
arbitration agreements even when they are included in contracts of adhesion57 unless the
party objecting to arbitration establishes that the arbitration agreement is both
procedurally and substantively unconscionable.58
Arbitration agreements imposed on a take-it-or-leave-it basis in a contract of
adhesion between parties of unequal bargaining power are considered either to be
procedurally unconscionable or to have elements supporting a finding of procedural
unconscionability.59 Procedural unconscionability reflects the fact that the weaker
party’s agreement, though not necessarily coerced, lacks the hallmarks of voluntariness.
However, procedural unconscionability alone is insufficient to avoid enforcement of an
arbitration agreement. Only if the objecting party also establishes substantive
unconscionability will the court refuse to enforce the arbitration agreement when it is
included in a contract of adhesion.60 Generally, substantive unconscionability can be
56

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2016); see Rent–A–Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010).

57

E.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 346-47 (2011) (upholding arbitration agreement
in contract of adhesion and noting “the times in which consumer contracts were anything other than
adhesive are long past”); Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 63 (upholding adhesive arbitration agreement in
employment contract); Fagerstrom v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 15-cv-96-BAS-DHB, 2015 WL 6393948 at *2
(S.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2015) (“By placing your order, you agree to Amazon.com's privacy notice and
conditions of use” was sufficient notice to bind purchaser to adhesive arbitration agreement).
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shown by whether the terms of the arbitration agreement are one-sided and unfair to the
weaker party.
It is here that the Federal Arbitration Act’s facially neutral law regarding
enforcement of arbitration agreements breaks down when applied to religious arbitration
agreements because parties opposing religious arbitration on religious grounds are
severely handicapped when attempting to prove that a particular set of religious
arbitration rules or procedures is substantively unconscionable. For example, in Garcia
v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization, Inc.,61 the Garcias, former members
of the Church of Scientology, filed an action in federal court alleging the Church of
Scientology fraudulently induced them to make certain donations and other payments.
The Church of Scientology filed an application to compel arbitration based on an
arbitration agreement included in member services contracts that the Garcias entered into
when they were committed Scientologists. It was undisputed that the arbitration
agreements were contracts of adhesion. If the Garcias wished to participate in Church of
Scientology services, they were required to sign the religious arbitration agreements on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis.
The court determined that under neutral provisions of applicable Florida contract
law, the arbitration agreement could be voided only if it were determined to be both
procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The court rejected the Garcias’ argument
that merely because the agreement was the result of a contract of adhesion it was
procedurally unconscionable. The court ruled that under Florida law even though the
agreement was a contract of adhesion, it was not procedurally unconscionable because
there was no surprise (the Garcias were well aware of the terms of the contract) and the
arbitration agreement generally informed the Garcias of the arbitration agreement’s scope
and procedures.62 Although this conclusion may be correct under Florida state law, as
shown above, commonly the fact that an arbitration agreement is the product of adhesion
at least makes it somewhat procedurally unconscionable.
Having found no procedural unconscionability, the court need not have
addressed substantive unconscionability. Nonetheless, the court did so. The court
determined that the arbitration agreement was not substantively unconscionable. It was
undisputed that pursuant to the terms of the religious arbitration agreement all arbitrators
must be Scientologists in good standing.63 The Garcias complained that under
Scientology doctrine, Scientologists in good standing must dissociate themselves from
former Scientologists, such as the Garcias, because they are labeled “suppressive

substantively unconscionable); Fagerstrom, 2015 WL 6393948 at *49 (enforcing agreement to arbitrate in
consumer contract of adhesion where assent is determined by clicking on online tab); CarMax Auto
Superstores California LLC v. Hernandez, 94 F. Supp. 3d 1078, 1127 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (arbitration
agreement imposed on employee as contract of adhesion was procedurally unconscionable, but was
enforced because it was not substantively unconscionable).
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persons.”64 Therefore, the Garcias complained, they could not possibly get a fair and
neutral arbitrator. The court rejected this ground on the basis that the First Amendment
prohibited the court from examining church doctrine to determine whether a fair hearing
could be had before a panel of Scientologists:
As compelling as Plaintiffs’ argument might otherwise be, the First
Amendment prohibits consideration of this contention, since it
necessarily would require an analysis and interpretation of
Scientology doctrine. That would constitute a prohibited intrusion
into religious doctrine, discipline, faith, and ecclesiastical rule,
custom, or law by the court.
Indeed, Plaintiffs earlier
acknowledged that “[t]he hostility of any Scientologists on [the
arbitration panel] is . . . church doctrine.” Accordingly, the court
has no jurisdiction to consider this argument.65
Because the burden of proof was on the Garcias to establish substantive
unconscionability and they could not do so without entangling the court in church
doctrine, the religious arbitration agreement was determined not be substantively
unconscionable. Having determined that the arbitration agreement was neither
procedurally nor substantively unconscionable, the court compelled religious arbitration
of all disputes between the Garcias and the Church of Scientology.
The Garcia case purports to rely on neutral principles of state contract law to
determine procedural and substantive unconscionability. It does not in fact do so.
Because the court could not (and should not) become entangled in the religious doctrines,
rules and procedures of the Church of Scientology, the court could make no ruling on
whether the Church of Scientology’s procedures are substantively unconscionable. In
this case, the court was barred from finding that a Church of Scientology procedural
requirement for all arbitrators to be members of the Church in good standing was
procedurally unconscionable when engaged in arbitration with a former member of the
Church because such a finding would require examination of Church doctrine, rules and
procedures.
Even if an arbitrator who is a member of the Church of Scientology in good
standing is required by church doctrine to have an adjudicatory bias against former
church members, there is nothing a court could do about it when the facially neutral
Federal Arbitration Act encounters religious doctrine. Indeed, even after arbitration, a
litigant would have considerable difficulty challenging an award based on bias because
any such finding would require the court to investigate the Church of Scientology’s
doctrine concerning adjudication of claims with “suppressives.” Therefore, even if the
court had found the Garcia arbitration agreement to be procedurally unconscionable
under Florida law, the court nonetheless would have enforced the religious arbitration
agreement because the Garcias were disabled from proving substantive
unconscionability.
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Had the Church of Scientology been a secular organization unable to claim the
protections of the First Amendment, there is little doubt but that the arbitrator selection
clause in the Garcia’s arbitration agreement would have been seen as problematic. For
example, in Zaborowski v. MNH Government Services, Inc.,66 an arbitration agreement in
a contract of adhesion called for one party to select the arbitrators. The court found the
agreement to be substantively unconscionable even though the arbitrators were required
to be licensed to practice law and neutral. The court found that granting “one party nearunfettered discretion to select its three preferred arbitrators is ‘unjustifiably one-sided’.”67
In Garcia, the Church of Scientology could mandate that the arbitrator be a member of its
organization and, thus, bound by that organization’s ecclesiastical rules. That kind of
power over selection is one-sided in the secular context, but unreviewable in the context
of religious arbitration.
Moreover, as has been made clear in secular arbitration, a party is not required to
provide the very difficult proof of actual arbitrator bias, only the appearance of bias.68
Here, unless the Scientologist-arbitrator makes some demonstrated outward display of
bias, the Garcias probably could not show actual bias. For the same reasons the trial
court refused on non-interference grounds to consider the “suppressive” doctrine at the
front end of the arbitration, it must also refuse to consider that doctrine at the back end of
the arbitration. If this had been a secular arbitration where the arbitrator was required to
be a member of a secular organization and the rules of that organization required the
arbitrator to consider one of the parties to be “suppressive,” the court would have little
trouble in at least considering substantive unconscionability. However, in the context of
religious arbitration, it cannot do so on the grounds of non-interference with religion.
In Spivey v. Teen Challenge of Florida, Inc.,69 another Florida court compelled
religious arbitration where the arbitration agreement was included in a contract of
adhesion. In Spivey, a nineteen-year-old man signed an agreement to enter a yearlong
faith-based substance abuse program. As part of that program, the young man was
required to sign a non-negotiable arbitration agreement calling for arbitration of all
disputes under Christian Conciliation. His time in the program was unsuccessful, and he
was released from the program within a few months. Following his release, the young
man died of a drug overdose. The young man’s mother brought an action in state court
for wrongful death against Teen Challenge on behalf of the young man’s estate. In
opposition to Teen Challenge’s application to compel arbitration, the young man’s
mother argued that her religious rights are violated if she is required to participate in
religious arbitration because “the Rules of Procedure for Christian Conciliation are
imbued with religious themes and require religious practices” and the “arbitration process

Zabrowski v. MHN Gov’t Servs., 601 F. App’x 461, 463 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted (case settled before
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. . . invokes religious principles and (at least facially) involves religious acts such as
prayer.”70
The court rejected these challenges on the basis that the young man had
voluntarily agreed to resolve all future disputes through religious arbitration and that Ms.
Spivey, as his representative, was bound by her deceased son’s agreement to engage in
religious arbitration.71 The court then noted that courts frequently uphold religious
arbitration agreements and that many of the rules of Christian Conciliation are no
different from their secular counterparts.72 Accordingly, Florida’s First District Court of
Appeal confirmed the trial court’s order compelling arbitration:
We find nothing in Florida or federal law suggesting that the trial
court's decision to require arbitration of the wrongful death claim
under the Teen Challenge mediation/arbitration agreement and its
Rules was other than wholly proper. Indeed, had the trial court
determined that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable due to
its religious nature, its action “could itself arguably constitute an
impermissible entanglement” under religion clause jurisprudence.73
The court thus determined that because the plaintiff’s nineteen year old son had agreed to
religious arbitration as a condition to entering into the Teen Challenge program, the
plaintiff, as her son’s representative in a wrongful death action, was bound to religious
arbitration regardless of her personal religious beliefs and regardless of the fact that the
arbitration agreement had been included in a contract of adhesion.74
What these cases have in common is that the application of neutral principles of
law does not work to protect the religious freedom of the litigants in contracts of
adhesion. As noted above, even if the Garcia court had found the arbitration agreement
to be procedurally unconscionable, it still would have been required under neutral
principles of law to compel the Garcias to engage in religious arbitration because the
Garcias were disabled from proving substantive unconscionability.75 In Spivey v. Teen
Challenge, the court disregarded the religious rights of the decedent’s representative and
enforced a pre-dispute contract of adhesion to engage in religious arbitration. As
discussed below, these outcomes, though in compliance with neutral principles of law,
run roughshod over the objecting parties’ freedom of religion.
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B. Possible Solutions to the Problem off Religious Arbitration in Contracts of
Adhesion.
This article suggests two possible solutions to protect the religious freedom of
parties opposing religious arbitration in contracts of adhesion. First, there is an argument
that a court could apply the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to establish a
defense to an application to compel arbitration. Because there is some doubt as to
whether an order compelling arbitration meets the state action requirement of the RFRA,
a second argument is that where there is a sincere religious objection to religious
arbitration in a contract of adhesion and the court is prevented from ruling on that
objection due to the non-interference doctrine, the court should abstain from ruling on the
application to compel arbitration.
1.

Using the RFRA to Consider Whether a Party Has a Sincere
Religious Objection to Religious Arbitration

According to the Supreme Court, “Congress enacted RFRA in 1993 in order to
provide very broad protection for religious liberty.”76 The Supreme Court noted further
that the “Congress went far beyond what this Court has held is constitutionally
required.”77 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act itself declares that it was enacted
because “laws ‘neutral’ toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws
intended to interfere with religious exercise.”78 Consequently, the Supreme Court has
held that the RFRA “prohibits the Federal Government from taking any action that
substantially burdens the exercise of religion unless that action constitutes the least
restrictive means of serving a compelling government interest.”79
The RFRA provides that “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except
as provided in subsection (b) of this section.”80 The Supreme Court has interpreted this
to mean that “[i]f the Government substantially burdens a person’s exercise of religion,
under the Act that person is entitled to an exemption from the rule unless the Government
‘demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.”81
The first question is whether by compelling arbitration a court is engaged in
government action that substantially burdens an individual’s religious freedom when the
federal or state court requires that individual to resolve secular disputes in a religious,
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rather than a secular forum. This question requires a determination of whether
arbitration, as a creature of private contract, becomes state action when enforced under
the FAA or other state acts. Due to the private nature of arbitration, the court’s
enforcement is not obviously state action, though some legal scholars make good
arguments in support of the state action designation.82
In Lee v. Weisman, the Supreme Court held that prayer in public schools violates
the Establishment clause because “[i]t is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the
Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate
in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which ‘establishes a [state] religion or
religious faith, or tends to do so.’"83 	
 As discussed above, the key features of religious
arbitration include participation in the exercise of religious doctrine and procedures.
When a court orders a party to engage in religious arbitration, the court is requiring the
party to participate in religion or its exercise, thereby substantially burdening that
person’s free exercise of religion.84 Absent consent of the parties, there can be little
doubt that a court could not order objecting parties to engage in religious arbitration.85
When a court orders parties to engage in religious arbitration, that order should be
considered “state action” sufficient to satisfy the state action requirements of the RFRA
or merely enforcement of private rights. The remainder of this section assumes that a
court would determine that the state action requirement is satisfied under these
circumstances.
Application of the RFRA to religious arbitration requires the presence of a
facially neutral law that burdens religion. The Federal Arbitration Act is a facially
neutral law that enforces agreements to arbitrate disputes. Section 2 of the Federal
Arbitration Act declares arbitration agreements “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract” under
state law.86 As shown above, this facially neutral law is applied to enforce religious
arbitration agreements on the presumption that the parties to religious arbitration have
given their consent to such procedures. As a safeguard to Section 2’s power to compel
arbitration, parties can avoid arbitration if they can show that the arbitration agreement is
void under state law grounds. In that regard, as discussed above, a court will not enforce
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an arbitration agreement if a party can show that it is both procedurally and substantively
unconscionable. However, this exception to FAA Section 2 does not apply to religious
arbitration agreements where a party bases its substantive unconscionability objection on
the religiosity of the rules and procedures included in the arbitration agreement.
The unconscionability defense under Section 2 of the FAA does not work for
religious objections to religious arbitration agreements because the non-interference
doctrine largely disables the objecting party from showing substantive unconscionability
to religious arbitration. Thus, even where the indicia of consent are weak, under existing
case law courts nonetheless have forced parties to engage in religious arbitration. In
contrast, under an adhesive secular arbitration agreement, a party would be permitted, for
example, to establish that the arbitrator qualifications or rules set forth in the arbitration
agreement make the agreement substantively unconscionable because they are onesided.87 However, as seen in the Garcia case, a party is not entitled to the same
opportunity under religious arbitration even where there the arbitrator qualifications on
their face raise a serious issue of substantive unconscionability. Thus, not only is the
facially neutral Federal Arbitration Act burdensome to the free exercise of religion,
because of the non-interference doctrine, it actually has the effect of only burdening the
free exercise of religion.
To remedy this burden on freedom of religion, the RFRA provides an additional
defense to Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act where this facially neutral law
requires religious arbitration in contracts of adhesion or otherwise procedurally
unconscionable circumstances against the religious beliefs of the weaker party. This
defense is available under the RFRA unless it can be shown that the government has a
compelling interest to require a party to engage in religious arbitration.
In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,88 the
Supreme Court ruled that the “RFRA requires the Government to demonstrate that the
compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law ‘to the
person’—the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially
burdened.”89 In Gonzales, members of a religion sought a preliminary injunction

against enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act with regard to certain plants
with hallucinogenic qualities that were banned under the Act. The members of the
religion used the plants to make sacramental tea. The Court acknowledged that
the government had an interest in banning the plant due to its harmful effects, but
declared that “[u]nder the more focused inquiry required by RFRA and the compelling
interest test, the Government's mere invocation of the general characteristics of Schedule
I substances, as set forth in the Controlled Substances Act, cannot carry the day.”90 The
Court went on to note that the Controlled Substances Act allowed for exceptions,
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including exceptions for religious use.91 Accordingly, the Court upheld the right under
the RFRA to a preliminary injunction barring application of the Controlled Substances
Act to the members of this religion.92
There can be no compelling interest to enforce Section 2 of the Federal
Arbitration Act to require parties with a sincere religious objection to engage in religious
arbitration when religious arbitration is imposed on them in a contract of adhesion.
Parties to an adhesive religious arbitration agreement cannot fully take advantage of
Section 2’s neutral state law exception to enforcement because they are disabled under
the non-interference doctrine from proving substantive unconscionability of religious
rules and procedures even when, as was the case in Garcia v. Scientology, the arbitrator
qualifications mandated by the Scientology arbitration system threatened to treat former
members, such as the Garcias, differentially from members of the Church. The Garcias
were not permitted to provide evidence of substantive unconscionability because it is
impermissible for a court to inquire into the religious qualifications of arbitrators in
religious arbitration, the religious procedures they may use, or the religious principles on
which they are bound to make a decision. Had the arbitration agreement not invoked
religious principles and procedures, the Garcias would have been able to take full
advantage of the state law exception to Section 2. If Scientology were a secular
organization and not a religion, the Garcias would have been permitted to challenge as
substantively unconscionable the requirement that the arbitrator be a member of that
organization where current members were required by the organization to treat former
members differentially.
The state law contract exception to Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act is
designed to safeguard against one’s loss of the right to litigate disputes in secular courts
where the arbitration agreement waiving such rights lacks procedural fairness and
includes substantively unconscionable provisions. The government can have no
compelling interest to eliminate that safeguard to Section 2 solely with respect to parties
who object to the religious provisions in religious arbitration agreements that have been
imposed on them by a party with superior bargaining power and have the hallmarks of
procedural unconscionability.
Without a compelling government interest in imposing religious arbitration on an
objecting party, there is no need to determine if compelling religious arbitration is the
least restrictive alternative as otherwise would be required under the RFRA, whatever
that might be. Accordingly, under the plain language of the RFRA, “[a] person whose
religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation
as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a
government.”93
Finally, “[t]o qualify for RFRA’s protection, an asserted belief must be
“sincere.”94 Thus, a “pretextual assertion of a religious belief in order to obtain an
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exemption for financial reasons would fail.” 95 Whether a party holds a sincere religious
objection is a matter for the courts to decide. The Hobby Lobby court cited with approval
United States v. Quaintance, in which the defendants sought to avoid criminal
prosecution for possession and sale of marijuana under the RFRA based on their
adherence to the principles of the “Church of Cognizance, which teaches that marijuana
is a deity and sacrament.”96 The Court of Appeals in Quaintance rejected the defendants’
appeal of their conviction and found that the defendants could not rely on the RFRA
because their objection to the criminal statute was not based on a sincere religious belief:
After taking extensive evidence, the district court denied the
motion to dismiss. It held, as a matter of law, that the Quaintances'
professed beliefs are not religious but secular. In addition and in
any event, the district court found, as a matter of fact, that the
Quaintances don't sincerely hold the religious beliefs they claim to
hold, but instead seek to use the cover of religion to pursue secular
drug trafficking activities.97
The Quaintance court assessed the religiosity of the defendants’ asserted religious
belief system using a five-factor test:
ultimate ideas, metaphysical beliefs, moral or ethical system,
comprehensiveness of beliefs, and accoutrements of religion. The
last factor includes ten subfactors: founder, teacher, or prophet;
important writings; gathering places; keepers of knowledge;
ceremonies and rituals; structure or organization; holidays; diet or
fasting; appearance and clothing; and propagation.98
Thus, a court can assess whether a party asserts the RFRA as a defense to compelling
religious arbitration based on that party’s sincere religious beliefs as a matter of factual
inquiry, something courts are able to do and have done with some frequency in the past.99
Had the RFRA been interposed as a defense, the outcomes of cases with facts
similar to Spivey v. Teen Challenge and Garcia v. Scientology might have come out
differently, depending on the applicable state law of procedural unconscionability. In
Garcia v. Scientology, where the plaintiff could not establish substantive
unconscionability due to the non-interference doctrine, there is a clear burdening of the
Garcias’ religious rights by requiring them to engage in religious arbitration under a
religious regime they rejected. Assuming the Garcias could establish their sincere
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religious objection to religious arbitration under Scientology’s rules (for which their
abandonment of the Scientology church appears to be good evidence), the government
has no compelling reason to burden the Garcias’ religious beliefs by requiring them to
engage in religious arbitration in a contract of adhesion, especially in states that declare
contracts of adhesion to be procedurally unconscionable and oppressive on their face.100
In Spivey v. Teen Challenge, where the court ruled that the objecting plaintiff’s
representative must stand in the shoes of the decedent and, therefore, was bound by the
religious arbitration agreement that had been included in a contract of adhesion, there was
a burdening of the representative’s religious rights both as an individual and as the
authorized representative of the deceased. Standing in the shoes of the decedent, the
representative must have the right to raise all defenses available to the deceased,
including the RFRA. If the decedent’s representative’s objection to religious arbitration
was based on sincere religious beliefs attributable to the deceased (a question of fact
subject to proof), the government lacks a compelling interest to ignore those beliefs and
enforce a pre-dispute religious arbitration agreement in a contract of adhesion.
2.

Abstention

Due to the state action requirement, it is uncertain whether a court properly could
apply the RFRA to applications to compel arbitration under the FAA or analogue state
laws. If a party resisting religious arbitration on the basis of religious grounds cannot use
the RFRA, then courts should refuse to compel arbitration where resolution of a religious
question is required to determine the outcome.
Under the abstention doctrine, courts decline to take action when presented with a
religious question.101 Here, if a court is prohibited from considering state law grounds to
refuse enforcement of an arbitration agreement because to do so would require the court
to make a religious question determination, the court should refuse to make any
determination at all on that ground. If a party to a contract of adhesion contends that the
arbitration agreement is unconscionable on religious grounds, the court cannot make a
ruling on unconscionability. Thus, in Garcia, if the determination of whether to grant
Scientology’s application to compel arbitration turned on whether the religious arbitration
agreement was substantively unconscionability, and that determination required
determination of an ecclesiastical issue, then the court should refrain from both making
the determination of substantive unconscionability and abstain from deciding the motion
to compel arbitration.
Refusing to make any decision on an application to compel arbitration under these
circumstances is different from using the abstention doctrine to uphold the ecclesiastical
decisions of religious tribunals. Here, religious tribunals are not making decisions.
Instead, it is the court that is making a decision to grant or deny an application to compel
100
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arbitration. To make its decision it must consider both procedural and substantive
unconscionability. If the court is prevented from making a decision on substantive
unconscionability because of the non-interference doctrine, it cannot make a decision on
the state law defense under Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act. Rather than decide
that the court doctrine of non-interference means the party opposing arbitration has failed
to meet its burden of proof, the court should decide that the abstention doctrine means the
court cannot rule one way or the other on the application to compel arbitration when the
objection is based on a good faith religious objection.
As discussed above, the court is in a position to determine as a matter of fact
whether the religious objection is made as a matter of good faith belief or as a matter of
expediency. If the religious objection is made as a matter of good faith belief, then the
court should not use its power to force an unwilling person to engage in religious
arbitration when there are indicia that the original agreement was not truly voluntary.
Thus, when procedural unconscionability is established for a contract of adhesion and the
court ordinarily must then make a determination of substantive unconscionability, the
court should decline to do so when a religious question is presented and simply abstain
from ruling on the application to compel arbitration. This result maintains the separation
of church and state and maintains the doctrine of non-entanglement in religious
questions.
VI. THE CONSEQUENCES OF SINCERE RELIGIOUS OBJECTIONS
RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

TO

ENFORCEMENT

OF

Application of the RFRA to religious arbitration agreements under the FAA does
not eliminate religious arbitration. The effects of the RFRA on the FAA only apply to
the arbitration of secular disputes because ecclesiastical disputes already are protected
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments’ non-interference doctrine. Under that
doctrine, the parties cannot object to determinations of ecclesiastical matters made by
appropriate religious institutions. As noted above, courts will not become entangled in
ecclesiastical disputes and will enforce whatever outcome is reached by the highest
ecclesiastical authority.
Application of the RFRA to religious arbitration agreements under the FAA also
does not affect the right of parties to voluntarily submit their disputes to religious
arbitration. Voluntary religious arbitration agreements should be enforced under Section
2 of the FAA even though the grounds to review any arbitral award may be narrower than
for secular arbitration agreements. This is so because the parties’ agreement lacks
procedural unconscionability. Indeed, as noted above, at least two courts opined that
failure to enforce the parties’ voluntary agreement to resolve disputes in religious
arbitration burdens their free exercise of religion.
The RFRA does not apply to religious arbitration agreements where a party’s
objection is not based on sincere religious belief. This can come about in two ways.
First, the objection to arbitration may have nothing to do with the religiosity of the
arbitration proceedings. In that event, the objecting party has full access to the state law
defense to Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act. For example, in Graves v. George
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Fox University102 the plaintiff brought an action in federal court based on his termination
from employment as an admissions counselor at George Fox University. The University
moved to compel arbitration based on a Christian Conciliation arbitration clause in an
employee handbook. The plaintiff objected to arbitration on the basis that the arbitration
agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The claim of procedural
unconscionability was based on the fact that the agreement was part of a contract of
adhesion and “hidden” in an employee handbook.
The claim of substantive
unconscionability was based on what were asserted to be one-sided provisions in the
arbitration agreement. The plaintiff did not raise religious objections to the religious
arbitration agreement.103 The court rejected the claims of unconscionability and ordered
religious arbitration.104
Second, the objecting party may be unable to establish that its religious objections
are sincere. The party’s objection to religious arbitration may be a pretextual attempt to
find a more favorable forum. Because sincerity of religious belief is required to apply the
RFRA, the RFRA defense would not be available under that circumstance.
The RFRA should apply to prevent court enforcement of religious arbitration
agreements regarding secular disputes where the objecting party’s ability to make a state
law objection to Section 2 enforcement is burdened by the doctrine of non-interference.
If a secular employer in a contract of adhesion requires a Jewish employee to agree to
Christian religious arbitration as a condition of employment, it would be a violation of
the Jewish employee’s religious freedom under the RFRA for a court to compel that
employee to engage in Christian arbitration over his or her sincere religious objection.105
In addition, as hypothesized at the beginning of this article, if a company in a
consumer contract of adhesion required its Christian customers to engage in Islamic
arbitration, it would be a violation of the Christian customers’ religious freedom under
the RFRA for a court to require the Christian customer to settle disputes with the
company in Islamic arbitration over the Christian customer’s sincere religious
objection.106
102

Graves v. George Fox University, No. CV06-395-S-EJL, 2007 WL 2363372 (D. Idaho Aug. 16, 2007).
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Employees subjected to religious arbitration in a contract of adhesion may have a defense under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which, according to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
prohibits covered employers from imposing religious programs on employees as a condition of
employment. See Questions and Answers: Religious Discrimination in the Workplace, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/qanda_religion.html (last visited
Jan. 3, 2016). However, Title VII, by its terms, does not apply “to a religious corporation, association,
educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to
perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or
society of its activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(1) (2016).
104

Graves, 2007 WL 2363372.
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As noted above, such an arbitration agreement also likely violates Title VII barring discrimination in
conditions of employment based on religion. See supra note 103.
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It is, however, possible to waive this objection by waiting until after arbitration is held to raise the
objection. Cf. Lieberman v. Lieberman, 566 N.Y.S.2d 490 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (confirming award rendered
through religious arbitration despite objecting party’s allegation that arbitration agreement was coerced
where objection was not raised until after conclusion of the arbitration proceedings.)
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Federal Arbitration Act requires courts to compel parties to arbitrate disputes
that are subject to a valid arbitration agreement. However, under the non-interference
doctrine, when determining validity of the arbitration agreements, the First and
Fourteenth Amendments prevent parties to religious arbitration agreements from
establishing grounds to revoke the agreements or from objecting to the fairness of the
religious rules and procedures used in religious arbitration even though these same
grounds would be available to challenge the fairness of rules and procedures for secular
arbitration agreements. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act cures this defect so that,
absent waiver, a court cannot compel a party to engage in religious arbitration of secular
disputes in procedurally unconscionable contracts of adhesion against the weaker party’s
sincerely held religious beliefs.
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